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Rights and Obligations of Arbitrators in the 
Deliberations 
BERNHARD BERGER* 
1. Introduction  
This article addresses the legal framework of the deliberations, i.e. the 
rights and obligations of arbitrators in the deliberation process. It derives 
from an introductory presentation held at the ASA Conference of 1 February 
2013 devoted to the topic: “Inside the Black Box – How Arbitral Tribunals 
Operate and Reach their Decisions”.1  
What is a “black box”? In natural science, a “black box” seems to be a 
term used for a device or system whose inner workings are unknown.2 More 
precisely, it is described as something that can be viewed solely from the 
outside, in that you only know the input, output and transfer characteristics, 
but you have no knowledge of its internal workings. In other words, the 
details on the implementation of the result (the output) remain in the dark 
(black). The opposite of a black box would thus be a “glass box” or “white 
box”, i.e. a system whose inner components are available for inspection.  
If we apply these criteria to arbitration from the parties’ perspective, 
the deliberations must in fact appear as some kind of “black box”, given that 
they only know the totality of all the arguments and motions put forward by 
them in contradictory proceedings (input), the result of the arbitration in the 
form of the dispositive part of the arbitral award (output), and the reasons 
given for the decision in the award (transfer). The parties normally have no 
access, however, to information about how the members of the arbitral 
tribunal ultimately arrived at, and agreed on, their decision. In other words, 
they do not know and cannot (or at least should not) find out about the 
inherent unspoken motives of an arbitral award. For example, is there 
perhaps a relatively “mild” decision on quantum as a bargaining chip for a 
unanimous affirmation of liability?  
Over the last one or two decades arbitration has gradually developed 
into a neatly structured process: from the constitution of the tribunal to the 
                                                     
*  Dr. iur. (Berne), LL.M. (Harvard), Partner at Kellerhals, Basle/Berne/Zurich, Member of the Board of 
ASA Swiss Arbitration Association, Member of the Arbitration Court of the Swiss Chambers’ 
Arbitration Institution, Lecturer at University of Bern Faculty of Law.  
1 See ASA President Michael E. Schneider’s Message on “Arbitral Decision Making – a Look into the 
Black Box” in ASA Bull. 2012, pp. 509-511.  
2 See the definition of “black box” in the Wikipedia free encyclopedia (www.wikipedia.org).  
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terms of reference, the famous set of specific procedural rules and the 
provisional timetable, the written submissions, document production, the 
style of the evidentiary hearing, and the streamlined, sometimes even 
scrutinised arbitral award, just to name a few of these well-explored and 
largely standardised steps. Some of us might even say that we see a trend 
towards “preformatted” arbitration.  
Despite this trend, the deliberations among the tribunal members have 
largely remained terra incognita where only on rare occasions any defects or 
other insufficiencies have been reported which then gave rise to a debate on 
the integrity of the process and the consequences of the failure on the award, 
whether at the stage of setting-aside or enforcement.3  
This notion of terra incognita includes that we know little about how 
arbitral tribunals in fact organise themselves in the deliberations. This may 
have several reasons. One certainly is that every arbitral tribunal is unique in 
the sense that it is not a standing body like a state court but rather an ad hoc 
panel chosen by the parties to decide “their” dispute, with the result that its 
members cannot normally rely on any pre-existing experience with each 
other and therefore have to agree on how to proceed in the first place. 
Another reason is that the stage of the deliberations is the first (and final) step 
in the arbitration where there is no longer any interaction between the parties 
and the tribunal. The parties are not allowed to attend the deliberations, let 
alone to participate in them. Unlike in some state courts, the deliberations of 
an arbitral tribunal are (almost universally) considered as something that 
takes place in camera – the confidentiality of the deliberations is seen as an 
inherent feature of international commercial arbitration.4 When there is no 
longer any interaction between the parties and the tribunal, like in the 
deliberations, there is no longer any need for a well-structured and 
transparent process, it seems.  
In view of these considerations, it does not come as a surprise that, for 
example, the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings of 1996 
are totally silent on the topic of deliberations and votes, while all other steps 
of the arbitration in which there is interaction between the parties and the 
                                                     
3 On insights into the secret – and sometimes opaque – specificities of international arbitration, see in 
general: Draetta, Behind the Scenes in International Arbitration, 2011, passim.  
4 Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2009, Vol. I, p. 1632; Vol. II, pp. 1869, 2269; Berger and 
Kellerhals, International and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland, 2010, N 1344; Fouchard, Gaillard 
and Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration, 1999, N 1374; Girsberger and Voser, 
International Arbitration in Switzerland, 2012, N 615, N 980; Lalive, Poudret and Reymond, Le droit 
de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse, 1989, Art. 189 N 11; Poudret and Besson, 
Comparative Law of International Arbitration, 2007, N 734a; Wirth, Basler Kommentar, 2006, Art. 
189 IPRG N 25.  
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tribunal are dealt with in detail. Does that mean that the drafters of the Notes 
were of the opinion that the deliberations and votes are something that is not 
part of the “arbitral proceedings” or did they consider that this is something 
that does not need to be “organised”?  
2. The legal source of the deliberations  
In multi-member arbitral tribunals the need for deliberations – defined 
as a joint effort by the arbitrators to identify the relevant issues and then 
proceed to an active exchange of arguments, ideas, reflections and a weighing 
of options on those issues5 – is described by most legal commentators both as 
a matter of course and as a legal requirement.6 But why is that?  
We should not forget that, for example, in the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
about 80% of the cases in civil and commercial matters are decided with no 
“real” deliberations taking place at all, meaning that the draft judgment 
prepared by the instructing judge is approved and adopted by his/her fellow 
judges without further comment.  
I am therefore inclined to make the following case: If no judge or no 
arbitrator so requests, there is no need, let alone a legal requirement for a 
separate (and purely artificial) round of deliberation, with the result that the 
relevant judgment or award is neither subject to annulment nor non-
recognition.  
But why then are the deliberations seen as such an essential, 
indispensable feature of arbitration? In my opinion, the answer is not 
mysterious but rather simple: in multi-member arbitral tribunals the need for 
deliberations arises in almost all cases from the fact that such a tribunal is – 
besides the chairperson – composed of two party-appointed arbitrators and 
these two judges – although they shall be impartial and independent – are 
expected by their nominating parties to ensure that their (contrary) cases will 
find support and justice to the best extent possible.  
 
Notwithstanding the apparent need for deliberations in arbitration it is 
striking that this aspect of the decision-making process is rarely addressed by 
national arbitration laws, let alone comprehensively dealt with. Articles 
                                                     
5 For other attempts to define the notion of “deliberations” see, e.g. Bredin, Retour au délibéré 
arbitral, Mél. Reymond, 2004, pp. 45-46; Derains, La pratique du délibéré arbitral, Liber 
Amicorum Briner, 2005, p. 223; Mestre, Quelques réflexions sur la pratique du délibéré arbitral, 
Rev. arb. 2012, pp. 782-784. 
6 Poudret and Besson (fn. 4), N 733.  
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1476(2) and 1479 of the French NCPC mention the deliberations but do not 
address any of its particulars. In many arbitration laws (like the Swiss Private 
International Law Act) the term “deliberations” does not even appear. 
Instead, these laws simply deal with the decision-making by a panel of 
arbitrators – like Article 29 of the UNCITRAL Model Law:  
“In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, any 
decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be made, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, by a majority of all its members. 
However, questions of procedure may be decided by a presiding 
arbitrator, if so authorized by the parties or all members of the 
arbitral tribunal.”  
Similarly, many of the leading international arbitration rules lack any 
specific provisions on the deliberations and limit themselves to deal with the 
issue of majorities to be reached between the arbitrators when a decision has 
to be reached – like Article 33(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules ... 
“[w]hen there is more than one arbitrator, any award or other 
decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of 
the arbitrators.”  
... and somewhat more progressively as stated in Article 31(1) of the 
Swiss Rules and Article 31(1) of the ICC Rules which both add to the 
previously stated rule that ... 
“[i]f there is no majority, the award shall be made by the 
president of the arbitral tribunal alone.” 
The legal source of the deliberations therefore remains to a large 
extent a mystery – or just a “black box”. Some authors – like the majority 
in France – say that the requirement for deliberations must be seen as 
based on international public policy.7 Other authors – among them 
distinguished Swiss arbitration practitioners – consider that the parties 
have a right to deliberations arising from their right to be heard in 
adversarial proceedings as specified, for example, in Article 182(3) of the 
Private International Law Act.8  
                                                     
7 See, e.g. Bredin (fn. 5), p. 45; Leboulanger, Principe de collégialité et délibéré arbitral, Mél. 
Knoepfler, 2005, p. 266; Derains and Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration, 2005, p. 
307; Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1369. For Switzerland, see: Poudret and Besson (fn. 
4), N 733; Wirth, Basler Kommentar, 2006, Art. 189 IPRG N 10.  
8 Bucher, Commentaire Romand, 2012, Art. 189 LDIP N 3; Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 978, N 
994; Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi, Arbitrage international, Droit et pratique à la lumière de la LDIP, 
2010, N 675. The Swiss Federal Tribunal seems undecided on this matter, referring at the same time 
to both “a right of the parties” and “an unwritten rule of international public policy applicable to 
international arbitration in general”; see BGer 4P.115/2003 of 16 October 2003 E. 3.2.  
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In my opinion, both of these explanations are not entirely satisfactory.  
Once the proceedings have been declared closed and the procedure for 
the making of the award has commenced, the parties no longer enjoy the right 
to be heard in adversarial proceedings. As mentioned, there is no interaction 
anymore between the parties and the arbitral tribunal at this stage of the 
proceedings. Therefore, I am not convinced that the parties may invoke a 
“right to deliberations” against the arbitrators – at least not an enforceable 
one. It is inconceivable in my opinion that the parties (or each party 
individually) may have a claim for “specific performance” in this regard, 
with the result that there is also no enforceable “duty to deliberate” that can 
be imposed on the arbitrators.  
On the other hand, it appears as a shortcut to simply state that 
deliberations are a matter of international public policy. Public policy is not a 
self-sufficient term. As the Swiss Federal Tribunal – to take an example – has 
explained on many occasions, public policy as a ground for annulment or 
non-enforcement of an arbitral award needs to be substantiated by specific 
fundamental legal principles such as pacta sunt servanda, the prohibition of 
abusive use of rights, the principle of good faith and the like. In my opinion, 
for the reasons explained above, the deliberations as such are not a legal 
principle on their own.  
At least from the Swiss perspective, we rather have to examine whether 
the requirement for deliberations follows from one of the fundamental legal 
principles, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal considers as being part of 
(procedural) public policy. In this respect, I suggest that one of the possible 
anchors may be found in the specific legal relationship that exists between the 
arbitrators and the parties once the arbitral tribunal has been duly constituted. 
In Switzerland, most authors consider that this specific legal 
relationship rests on a contractual basis – a receptum arbitri – and is 
governed by the provisions on agency contracts.9 The essential obligations of 
an agent are his/her duty to perform the business entrusted to him/her in 
accordance with the instructions received from the principal and by applying 
due care, due diligence and by acting in good faith (see, e.g. Articles 397 and 
398 of the Swiss Code of Obligations).  
As discussed above, one of the reasons that parties select multi-
member arbitral tribunals (and in particular three arbitrator tribunals 
composed by two party-appointed co-arbitrators) is to ensure that by means 
of the process of deliberations a careful consideration of all issues to be 
                                                     
9 Lalive, Poudret and Reymond (fn. 4), Art. 179 N 6; Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 14. See also Rüede 
and Hadenfeldt, Schweizerisches Schiedsgerichtsrecht – nach Konkordat und IPRG, 1993, p. 41. 
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determined will take place and – hopefully – a sensible and “fair” outcome of 
the case may be reached. From this perspective, it seems justified to consider 
that the deliberations are part of the arbitrators’ general requirement to act in 
good faith in the performance of their obligations.  
As seen above, the principle of good faith is one of the fundamental 
principles that the Swiss Federal Tribunal accepts to be part of (international) 
public policy. Therefore, it seems to me that – in Switzerland – annulment or 
non-recognition of an arbitral award as a result of irregular, inadequate or no 
deliberations may be sought, if any, by invoking that the arbitrators have 
failed to comply with the fundamental principle of good faith and, as a result, 
have rendered an award that is incompatible with public policy.  
 
Apart from that, I consider that the “rights and obligations of 
arbitrators in the deliberations” concern issues which are open to party 
autonomy, unless the applicable arbitration law at the arbitral seat provides 
otherwise. In other words, the parties and the arbitrators may in principle, by 
agreement, establish rules to govern those issues.  
At the end of the day, however, the deliberations of an arbitral tribunal 
are largely driven by custom and by the way in which the arbitrators – by 
contractual intention – decide to establish and organise a framework for 
dealing with the issues to be determined in their actual case.  
This is so because, as seen above, arbitration laws and arbitration rules 
normally fail to provide guidance on the principles governing the 
deliberations and, thus, there are no pre-existing provisions to which the 
parties (and arbitrators) are deemed to have agreed upon by implied consent. 
Further, it is just as rarely the case that the parties (and, to the extent 
necessary, the arbitrators) have concluded a specific “tailor-made” agreement 
dealing with issues concerning the deliberations.  
Therefore, the main purpose of the following is to establish how the 
arbitral tribunal may want to address specific problems of the deliberations 
when there is no pre-existing rule and no subsequent agreement can be reached. 
3. Determining the process and timing of the deliberations  
Once the taking of evidence has been declared closed and oral 
arguments and/or post-hearing submissions have been delivered, a multi-
member arbitral tribunal is required to determine the process and timing of its 
deliberations. In my view, this is an obligation but also a right of the 
arbitrators. 
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As discussed above, most arbitration laws and arbitration rules are 
silent on this matter. Organising the process and timing of the deliberations 
thus remains a matter for the discretion of the arbitrators.10 The arbitral 
tribunal may deliberate at any location it considers appropriate – indeed, this 
is one of the few principles that arbitration rules occasionally address (see, 
e.g. Article 18(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules); it may instead hold 
telephone or video conferences, or may limit the deliberations to a written 
procedure, e.g. on the basis of a list of issues to be determined or a draft of 
the award which is normally prepared by the presiding arbitrator.11  
The length of the deliberations depends on a wide variety of factors 
such as the complexity of the case, the number of claims and issues to be 
decided, the diaries of the arbitrators, the degree of collegial cooperation 
between the arbitrators and so forth.12  
One of the driving factors may also be whether the award has to be 
made by unanimity, by majority or even – if there is no majority – by the 
presiding arbitrator alone.13 A multi-member tribunal normally seeks to reach 
a unanimous award which in fact may often be achieved.14 In deliberations 
where there is a substantial amount of what looks like “bargaining”,15 
however, different strategies may (or have to) be adopted depending on 
whether the tribunal is required to reach a unanimous result or the 
chairperson has the last word without regard to what the co-arbitrators may 
have to say.16  
                                                     
10 Rüede and Hadenfeldt (fn. 9), p. 294; Schlosser, Das Recht der internationalen privaten 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 1989, N 678; Wirth, Basler Kommentar, 2006, Art. 189 IPRG N 11. For 
example, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the arbitrators may agree – expressly or by conduct – 
that the deliberations take place “par voie de circulation”, i.e. by exchange of correspondence (BGE 
111 Ia 336 E. 3a; BGer 4P.115/2003 of 16 October 2003 E. 3.2).  
11 Derains and Schwartz (fn. 7), pp. 221-222; Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1372; 
Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 979, N 995; Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi (fn. 8), N 675; Poudret 
and Besson (fn. 4), N 734. For example, the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof held that there is no non-
recognition of an award on the grounds that the arbitrators did not meet in person to deliberate, but 
that the tribunal may deliberate by other means of communication (Judgment of 26 April 2006, 
XXXII Y.B.C.A. 2007, p. 259). 
12 Born (fn. 4), Vol. II, p. 1869.  
13 On the latter option, see: Reymond, The President of the Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Rev.-For. Inv. L.J. 
1994, p. 8.  
14 Born (fn. 4), Vol. II, p. 1870; Derains and Schwartz (fn. 7), p. 307.  
15 In complex cases with a variety of claims (and counterclaims) to be decided, unanimous awards are 
indeed quite frequently the result of mutual concessions; see, e.g. Bredin (fn. 5), p. 49.  
16 For a case in which the award has to be rendered by a majority, a rather anecdotal strategy is reported 
by Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Mgt Co., 597 F.2d 819, 822 (2d Cir. 1979) where the Court 
refused to vacate the award on the argument that the chairman had acted improperly by stating “he 
would sign an award with whichever of his colleagues would first agree to a number between $1.5 
million and $2.0 million”.  
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4. Participation in the deliberations  
Effective participation in the deliberations is certainly a right of each 
of the arbitrators.17 It may thus be claimed that the process of deliberations 
was faulty if two arbitrators have mobbed (like unsuccessfully claimed in the 
famous CME case18) or otherwise excluded their fellow arbitrator from an 
equal and reasonable participation in the decision-making process.19  
However, actual participation in the deliberations must also be seen as 
an obligation of the arbitrators.20 Article 382 of the Swiss Code of Civil 
Procedure, which applies to Swiss domestic arbitration proceedings, perfectly 
illustrates this by stating as follows:  
“(1) All arbitrators shall participate in the deliberations and 
votes.” 
“(2) If an arbitrator refuses to participate in a deliberation or 
vote, the other arbitrators may deliberate and decide in the 
absence of such arbitrator, unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise.”  
In my view, these principles, although not expressly mentioned in 
Article 189 of the Private International Law Act, shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to Swiss international arbitration cases.  
Consequently, when an arbitrator – usually a party-appointed one – 
refuses to participate in the deliberations and votes without valid reasons,21 
the remaining members of the panel may proceed with the making of the 
award in the absence of the reluctant member, unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise.22  
                                                     
17 Leboulanger (fn. 7), p. 263; Reymond (fn. 13), pp. 12, 14; Poudret and Besson (fn. 4), N 735; 
Girsberger, Basler Kommentar, 2010, Art. 382 ZPO N 21.  
18 Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Judgment of 15 May 2003, Case No. T 8735-01 (Svea 
Court of Appeal).  
19 See, e.g. Goeller v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 568 A.2d  176 (Pa. 1990) where the Court annulled the 
award because two arbitrators had excluded their fellow arbitrator from the deliberations.  
20 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1622; Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 1351; Lalive, Poudret and Reymond (fn. 
4), Art. 189 N 5; Poudret and Besson (fn. 4), N 735; Rüede and Hadenfeldt (fn. 9), pp. 212, 294; 
Wirth, Basler Kommentar, 2006, Art. 189 IPRG N 10.  
21 See on this and other dilatory tactics of arbitrators, Gaillard, Les manoeuvres dilatoires des parties et 
des arbitres dans l'arbitrage commercial international, Rev. arb. 1990, pp. 780 ss.  
22 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 1351. On the problem of “truncated” tribunals see, among many 
others, the specific studies of: Donahey, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Truncated 
Tribunal, Am. Rev. Int. Arb. 1993, pp. 191-197; Schwebel, The Authority of a Truncated Tribunal, 
ICCA Congress series Vol. 9, Paris 1999, pp. 314-318; Seifi, The Legality of Truncated Arbitral 
Tribunals (Public and Private): An Overview in the Wake of the 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration, Jnl. 
Int. Arb. 2000, pp. 3-46; Solhchi, The Validity of Truncated Tribunal Proceedings and Awards, Arb. 
Int. 1993, pp. 303-316.  
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Hence, the requirement that all arbitrators shall take part in the 
deliberations and votes is sufficiently observed if each arbitrator had the 
opportunity to do so.23 It is enough if the remaining active arbitrators keep 
the missing arbitrator informed of all significant stages in the making of the 
award and thereby offer him/her the opportunity to express him-/herself and 
take part in the decision-making at any time.24  
5. Duties of care, diligence and expedition  
The duties of care and diligence include devoting the necessary time 
and attention to the issues to be determined and analysing the submissions 
and evidence with the necessary skills and ability.25 The counterpart of these 
obligations is to decline the acceptance of cases for which the arbitrator in 
question may be ill-suited – for example, because of insufficient knowledge 
of the applicable law or lack of language skills – or may not have the 
necessary time available.26  
Furthermore, the arbitrators are generally expected to conduct the 
arbitration – and in particular also the deliberations – with expedition.27 This 
matter is sometimes addressed specifically in arbitration laws or arbitration 
rules which set periods of time for rendering the award (like, for example, 
Article 30(1) of the ICC Rules or Article 42(1) of the Swiss Rules for the 
Expedited Procedure) or even particularly agreed by the parties in the 
arbitration agreement or some subsequent arrangement providing for fast-
                                                     
23 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1373; Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 987; Kaufmann-
Kohler and Rigozzi (fn. 8), N 675; Wirth, Basler Kommentar, 2006, Art. 189 IPRG N 13.  
24 Thus, in the CME case the Svea Court of Appeal held that when a decision by a majority is 
required and two arbitrators agree on the outcome of the case, the third arbitrator “cannot prolong 
the deliberations by demanding continued discussions in an attempt to persuade the others as to the 
correctness of his opinion”. He is thus “not afforded any opportunity to delay the writing of the 
award” (Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Judgment of 15 May 2003, Case No. T 
8735-01). For Switzerland see BGE 128 III 234 in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal took a similar 
approach by upholding the award where a party-appointed arbitrator did not formally withdraw 
from his office, but only refused to cooperate or obstructed the proceedings, in particular by 
refusing to participate in the deliberations of the arbitral tribunal without valid reasons. But also 
see BGE 117 Ia 166 in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal vacated the award because it was 
rendered by the two remaining arbitrators after one of the co-arbitrators had resigned. For France 
see, e.g. Cour de cassation, Judgment of 28 January 1981, Rev. arb. 1982, p. 485: the party’s right 
to a fair hearing of its case is satisfied where the missing arbitrator was given the opportunity to 
make comments on the proposed amendments to the initial draft of the award; Paris Cour d'appel, 
Judgment of 1 July 1997, XXIV Y.B.C.A. 1999, pp. 281, 286: no non-recognition of an award 
rendered after one of the arbitrators had resigned from the tribunal.  
25 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1130; Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1621.  
26 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1621.  
27 Redfern and Hunter, International Arbitration, 2009, N 5.65; Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, pp. 1623-1624.  
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track arbitration.28 Sometimes time-limits are imposed by the institution that 
administers the case.29  
The important question, however, is: what remedies are available if the 
arbitrators – or some of them – fail to comply with these duties?30  
As discussed above, it is inconceivable that there be a right (of the 
parties or the other arbitrators) to specific performance against the defaulting 
arbitrator. 
Instead, the only way out of the problem is to have an arbitrator who 
fails to comply with the duties of care, diligence and expedition replaced. 
This remedy is generally available under both the applicable arbitration law 
and, if so agreed, the arbitration rules that govern the proceedings. In my 
view, the right to apply for the replacement of an arbitrator should be 
available not only to the parties but also to the other members of the panel.  
Be that as it may, it is conspicuous that the remedy of replacement of 
an arbitrator for having failed to properly fulfil his/her functions is very 
rarely used. I submit that this is not the case because all arbitrators just 
simply always proceed with their duties by applying the utmost care and 
diligence. Instead, I guess that replacements are so rare because, in practice, 
they may be very time-consuming and burdensome for both the parties and 
the remaining arbitrators and, therefore, are often not in the best interest of 
the case. Thus, when there is  an arbitrator on the panel who fails to comply 
with his/her duties, it is still often more convenient and reasonable for the 
parties and the other arbitrators to take the burden of dragging this arbitrator 
along with them rather than going through the process of replacement.  
6. Impartiality and independence  
The principle that arbitrators have to be and remain impartial and 
independent throughout the entire proceedings has become an inherent 
feature of modern international arbitration.31 Absence of independence or 
impartiality entails that the arbitrator in question may be challenged and, in 
                                                     
28 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1385; Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 988-989. 
29 The ICC’s standard letters to the tribunals newly include the following sentence: “The Court expects 
Arbitral Tribunals to submit draft awards for scrutiny within three months after the last hearing 
concerning matters to be decided in such award or the filing of the last authorised submission 
concerning such matters, whichever is later.”  
30 See on this question the specific study by Okekeifere, The Parties’ Rights Against a Dilatory or 
Unskilled Arbitrator, Jnl. Int. Arb. 1998, pp. 129-144.  
31 Redfern and Hunter (fn. 27), N 1.91, 4.72; Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1129.  
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the event, replaced by the competent authority, be it the courts at the arbitral 
seat (in ad hoc arbitration) or the agreed arbitral institution.  
Yet there still are arbitrators for whom, for whatever reason, it is 
unthinkable that they can decide the case in whole or in part against the party 
that had designated or appointed them. An attitude or mindset of this kind, 
which obviously gives rise to justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence, may often transpire only towards the end of the 
proceedings, in particular in the course of the deliberations.32  
How should the tribunal, in particular the presiding arbitrator, deal 
with this? 
For the same reasons as discussed above, a request for the replacement 
of the biased arbitrator will normally not be the most sensible solution. Having 
regard to the tried and tested maxim “gouverner c’est prévoir” the presiding 
arbitrator will try to identify such a “candidate” well in advance and think 
about how he/she could be kept at it as long and as effectively as possible.33 
The deliberations and the decision-making process of an arbitral 
tribunal often advance in an informal way. However, if there is a risk that 
one of the arbitrators is likely to make “real” difficulties, then it is 
important for the presiding arbitrator to properly record each step of the 
deliberations and decision-making process in the arbitral tribunal’s internal 
file.34 In particular, he/she should then give the co-arbitrators adequate 
advance notice of the date, time and place of any meetings or telephone 
conferences, make summary notes of those discussions and circulate them 
to his/her fellow arbitrators, properly announce when (and where) the panel 
shall vote on the dispositive part of the award, duly record the outcome of 
such voting and so forth. 
All these safety measures may prove to be very helpful in case of a 
subsequent challenge against the award on the grounds of any alleged 
irregularity in the decision-making process.  
7. Duty to apply the law  
Considering that the arbitral tribunal, by virtue of its functions under 
the applicable arbitration law and the provisions of the New York 
                                                     
32 Leboulanger (fn. 7), pp. 259-260.  
33 See more generally on this recommendation in order to prevent “pathological deliberations”, Derains 
(fn. 5), p. 222. On the relationship between the president and the arbitrators in these situations, see: 
Reymond (fn. 13), pp. 10-11.  
34 See on this issue also Karrer, Backstage in Arbitral Tribunals – Think ahead and go fast, Croatian 
Arbitration Yearbook, Vol. 20 (will be published in December 2013).  
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Convention, is empowered to decide the dispute between the parties in a 
legally binding and enforceable manner, the arbitrators have a duty to decide 
the case in accordance with the applicable law (or rules of law). 
In other words, sitting on an arbitral tribunal is not a “free ticket” to 
limit the view to the terms of the contract or trade usages, principles of lex 
mercatoria and the like, let alone to decide the case ex aequo et bono or as 
amiable compositeurs (save where so agreed by the parties), but to apply the 
law, including any mandatory provisions of the applicable law.35 This 
obligation particularly unfolds in the course of the deliberations.  
Here we once again face the problem of remedies. In many 
jurisdictions – like for example in Switzerland – there is no meaningful 
remedy. A failure by the arbitral tribunal to apply the law (or rules of law) 
governing the merits of the case does not fall within the narrow definition of 
an incompatibility with public policy.36  
Nonetheless, the duty of the arbitrator to (properly) apply the law is at 
the core of his/her mission. Any misuse of the “freedom” which the arbitral 
tribunal enjoys as a result of the parties’ impossibility to have an award 
vacated on the grounds of a wrong application of the law seriously 
compromises arbitration as a whole.37  
It is therefore not surprising that – as a result of the tremendous increase 
of cases over the last 10 to 15 years – voices are on the rise pleading for a 
loosening of the rigid system which, today, practically excludes that even a 
limited review of the merits by the courts at the arbitral seat takes place.38 
8. Obligation of performance in person (no delegation)  
The qualification of the arbitrator’s mission as a mandate or agency 
contract entails that he/she may in principle not delegate his/her tasks and 
responsibilities to third parties, nor to some of the tribunal members, for 
example to the presiding arbitrator.39 After all, the arbitrator has been 
selected to perform his/her function because of his/her personal skills, 
qualifications, experience, reputation etc.  
Consequently, the arbitrator cannot delegate his/her duties to attend the 
deliberations and participate in the decision-making (voting) – just as little as 
                                                     
35 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1626. 
36 BGE 116 II 634 E. 4.  
37 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1626.  
38 Lalive, L’Article 190 al. 2 LDIP a-t-il une utilité ? ASA Bull. 2010, p. 726.  
39 Reymond (fn. 13), p. 5.  
ARTICLES 
256 31 ASA BULLETIN 2/2013 (JUNE) 
he/she is allowed to delegate the other essential tasks of the tribunal in the 
course of the arbitration process, in particular organising the proceedings, 
assessing the parties’ written submissions, attending hearings, taking 
evidence and so forth.40  
A violation of this obligation would give rise to annulment or non-
recognition of the award on the grounds of irregular composition of the 
arbitral tribunal.41  
9. Assistance to the tribunal  
Despite the prohibition to delegate as discussed above, it is common 
for arbitrators to seek assistance in the course of the proceedings from 
various sources. The best known and perhaps most debated of these third 
parties is the secretary to the tribunal.42  
Assuming the arbitration law (like Article 365 of the Swiss Code of 
Civil Procedure) or the arbitration rules (like Article 15(5) of the Swiss 
Rules) or a specific agreement by the parties allows the appointment of a 
secretary or other third parties to assist the tribunal, one of the major 
questions is whether these assistants may attend the deliberations.  
In my view, the preferred solution in this regard is accurately described 
by Rule 15 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules:  
“(1) The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in 
private and remain secret.”  
“(2) Only members of the Tribunal shall take part in its 
deliberations. No other person shall be admitted unless the 
Tribunal decides otherwise.”  
In other words, the arbitral tribunal shall have full control over the 
question. Other persons (including a secretary) should only be allowed to 
attend the deliberations if all members of the arbitral tribunal consent to such 
participation. There should be a requirement for the tribunal to consult with 
the parties before allowing other persons than the arbitrators to attend, but the 
tribunal should keep the last word on this.  
If other persons than the arbitrators attend the deliberations – even 
when this happens without the consent of the parties – it is difficult to 
                                                     
40 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 1031, N 1197.  
41 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1629. 
42 Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration, Arb. 
Int. 2002, pp. 147-163; Mestre (fn. 5), p. 787. From the Swiss perspective, also see: Kaufmann-Kohler and 
Rigozzi (fn. 8), N 678; Rüede and Hadenfeldt (fn. 9), p. 194; Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 2), N 918-923. 
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imagine that this might give rise to a successful challenge of the award. The 
challenging party would have to demonstrate that the said third party, for 
example a secretary, has had a material influence on the outcome of the case. 
An incident of this kind, however, is difficult to imagine, at least where the 
arbitrators have fully discharged their duties, which includes that any work 
prepared by a non-member has been carefully reviewed and only been used 
or relied on with caution.  
10. Confidentiality of the deliberations  
As discussed above, the confidentiality of the deliberations is 
considered as an inherent feature of international arbitration,43 as evidenced, 
for example, by Article 9 of the IBA Rules of Ethics for International 
Arbitrators:  
“The deliberations of the arbitral tribunal, and the contents of 
the award itself, remain confidential in perpetuity unless the 
parties release the arbitrators from this obligation. An 
arbitrator should not participate in, or give any information for 
the purpose of giving any assistance in, any proceedings to 
consider the award unless, exceptionally, he considers it his 
duty to disclose any material misconduct or fraud on the part of 
his fellow arbitrators.”  
Confidentiality of the deliberations means on one hand that the 
deliberations have to take place in camera. As mentioned, only members of 
the tribunal and other persons admitted by the tribunal may attend. On the 
other hand, it entails that each arbitrator has an obligation and is bound to 
keep the development of the deliberations and the results of voting 
confidential, both from the parties and any uninvolved third parties.44  
According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the obligation to keep the 
deliberations confidential relates to “all opinions expressed in the course of 
the discussion, that is, ultimately, the way in which the majority was 
achieved.”45  
Thus, an arbitrator shall not provide the parties with any information 
on the course of the deliberations and votes.46 Such information may consist 
of the contents of oral discussions between the members of the panel and of 
                                                     
43 See the references in fn. 4 above.  
44 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 908; Girsberger, Basler Kommentar, 2010, Art. 382 ZPO N 13. 
45 BGer 4P.61/1991 of 12 November 1991 E. 1b/bb.  
46 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1374.  
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written documents such as drafts of the award, memoranda, working papers, 
exchanges of letters, faxes or emails between the arbitrators, etc.47  
 
Who holds the right to the confidentiality of the deliberations?  
Some may say it is the parties.48 The majority in legal writing, 
however, seems to support the view that the confidentiality of the 
deliberations and votes serves to protect the arbitrators.49  
But from what exactly shall it protect the arbitrators? What is so 
specific that arbitrators must be protected from it, while state court judges do 
not need such protection? After all, we should not forget that, at least in 
Switzerland, civil procedure commands that, in many courts, the 
deliberations in civil and commercial matters are public (cf. Article 54(2) of 
the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure).  
Having said this, neither of the two theories really is convincing. In my 
view, the main purpose of the confidentiality of the deliberations in 
international arbitration is to ensure that the parties do not find out or hear 
about the result of the award before its notification.  
Why is that important? Because, depending on the complexity of the 
case and other factors, it can take a long time from the date on which the 
tribunal closes the deliberations by voting on the dispositive part and the date 
on which the final “product” in the form of the written award with the 
reasons on which it is based can be notified to the parties.  
If, as a result of “open” deliberations and votes, a party knew well in 
advance of the award’s notification that it is going to lose, it may be tempted to 
commence taking adverse measures, which may include filing challenges 
against the arbitrators or stripping off assets to prevent future enforcement. 
Likewise, if a party knew well in advance that it will win the case it would be 
tempted to take advantage of that fact, for instance by trying to seize assets in 
the country of enforcement.50  
For these reasons, the arbitrators – especially the party-appointed ones 
– shall ensure and thus are obliged that throughout the proceedings but 
especially during the deliberations no information on the discussions between 
                                                     
47 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 1345. 
48 Born (fn. 4), Vol. I, p. 1663.  
49 Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 1167; Girsberger and Voser (fn. 4), N 981; Wirth, Basler 
Kommentar, 2006, Art. 189 IPRG N 27.  
50 See on these problems from a similar perspective, Karrer, Backstage in Arbitral Tribunals – Think 
ahead and go fast, Croatian Arbitration Yearbook, Vol. 20 (will be published in December 2013).  
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the tribunal members leaks to the parties, neither as a result of negligence nor 
– a fortiori – as a result of intentional misconduct in the form of ex parte 
contacts with one of the parties (normally the one who appointed them). 
Otherwise, the examples just mentioned demonstrate that equal treatment of 
the parties51 is made a mockery of if one party (but not the other) knows well 
in advance of the outcome of the case.  
 
A breach of the duty to keep the deliberations confidential may give rise 
to a claim for damages against the arbitrator who failed to comply with it.52 
However, it is difficult to imagine that the award as such may be 
affected by an unlawful disclosure of confidential information stemming 
from the deliberations. The mere fact of a breach of confidentiality does not 
therefore give rise to annulment or non-recognition of the award.  
11. Dissenting opinions  
The concept of “dissenting opinion” – understood to mean that a 
minority arbitrator makes available to the parties his/her own assessment of 
the case – is in obvious contrast to the principle of confidentiality of the 
deliberations.  
Despite this, dissenting opinions seem to have gradually become 
accepted instruments in international arbitration.53 In other words, the 
confidentiality of the deliberations is not an ultimate “barrier” for an 
arbitrator who is not in agreement with the majority to draft a dissenting 
opinion for the parties.  
Some authors consider that there is a “fundamental right” to disclose 
dissenting opinions under any circumstances.54 By contrast, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal considers that where the parties have not expressly excluded the 
notification of a dissenting opinion, it is a matter for the tribunal or the 
                                                     
51 See on this aspect of a violation of the confidentiality of the deliberations, Derains (fn. 5), pp. 225-
226.  
52 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 909, N 1350, N 1350; Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman (fn. 4), N 
1374; Girsberger, Basler Kommentar, 2010, Art. 382 ZPO N 17.  
53 As to whether dissents are for the better or worse, see: Rees and Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can they 
Fulfil a Beneficial Role? Arb. Int. 2009, pp. 329-346.  
54 See, e.g. Blessing, Das neue internationale Schiedsgerichtsrecht der Schweiz – Ein Fortschritt oder 
ein Rückschritt?, in: Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz, 1989, p. 74. In 
similar terms, Lévy, Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration in Switzerland, Arb. Int. 
1989, pp. 41-42.  
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majority of its members to decide whether, and in what form, a dissent 
should be made available to the parties.55  
In my view, the latter approach is preferable. To accept that dissenting 
opinions may be disclosed under any circumstances would mean to deny 
quite bluntly the principle of confidentiality of the deliberations.  
I accept, however, that there may be exceptional circumstances in 
which a minority arbitrator should be allowed to make available his/her 
dissent to the parties even without the consent of the majority. Such a 
situation may exist, for example, where the dissenting arbitrator, acting in 
good faith, considers it his/her duty to disclose “any material misconduct or 
fraud on the part of his fellow arbitrators” (Article 9 of the IBA Rules of 
Ethics) or to inform the parties of any serious procedural errors, which in 
his/her opinion have occurred during the deliberations, and which would 
otherwise have remained undiscovered.56  
 
As a matter of Swiss arbitration law, the legal effects of a dissenting 
opinion are limited. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held that a dissenting 
opinion is separate from the award and therefore does not affect either the 
reasons on which it is based or the dispositive part. Any defects of procedure 
that might have occurred in relation to the drafting or communication of the 
dissenting opinion thus have no effect on the award itself.57  
If an arbitrator exceeds his/her (limited) right to issue a dissenting 
opinion, for example makes it available to the parties without having 
informed his/her fellow arbitrators and obtained their approval, he/she in 
principle commits a breach of his/her duties arising from the receptum 
arbitri. Under Swiss law, however, as a result of the clear-cut case law of the 
Federal Tribunal, the consequences of such breach are limited or non-
existing. What remains, in my view, is a serious breach of the principle of 
collegiality vis-à-vis the other arbitrators.58  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 BGer 4P.23/1991 of 25 May 1992 E. 2b.  
56 Berger and Kellerhals (fn. 4), N 1369.  
57 BGer 4P.23/1991 of 25 May 1992 E. 2b.  
58 On particular aspects of dealing with dissents, see: Arroyo, Dealing with Dissenting Opinions in the 
Award: Some Options for the Tribunal, ASA Bull. 2008, pp. 437-466.  
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Summary 
The ASA Swiss Arbitration Association’s Annual Conference of 
1 February 2013 in Zurich was devoted to the topic: “Inside the Black Box 
– How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach their Decisions”. This article 
derives from an introductory presentation that the author held at the said 
Conference. It analyses the legal framework of the deliberations. The 
author identifies and discusses a number of rights and duties of arbitrators 
that specifically arise at the stage of the deliberations, such as determining 
the process and timing of the deliberations, the right (and obligation) to 
participate in the deliberations, the (limited) right of the tribunal to seek 
assistance from other persons, and the (restricted) right to disclose a 
dissenting opinion. Moreover, the article analyses some of the general 
duties of arbitrators in the particular context of the deliberations, such as 
the duty of confidentiality, the duties of care, diligence and expedition, the 
obligation to apply the law, and the duties to be and remain impartial and 
independent.  
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